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r e s u m e n
Se hace aquí una distinción entre formas de vitalismo, el ‘sustantivo’ 
y el ‘funcional’ en el siglo XVIII. El vitalismo sustantivo presupone 
la existencia de una fuerza vital (sustantiva) que desempeña una labor 
causal en el mundo natural que se estudia científicamente, o que perma-
nece como una entidad extra-causal e inmaterial. El vitalismo funcional 
tiende a operar post facto, desde la existencia de los cuerpos vivos hasta la 
búsqueda de modelos explicativos que darán cuenta de sus propiedades 
‘vitales’ exclusivas, mejor de lo que los modelos mecanicistas lo pueden 
hacer. En este artículo analizo figuras representativas de la Escuela de 
Montpellier (Bordeu, Ménuret, Fouquet) en tanto vitalistas funcionalistas 
más que sustancialistas, y sugiero algo más sobre la represalia al vitalismo 
(o vitalismos) en el siglo XX desde Driesch hasta Canguilhem, a saber, 
que además de las variedades ‘sustantiva’ y ‘funcional’, encontramos 
una tercera clase de vitalismo que llamo ‘actitudinal’, como su nombre 
lo indica, afirma el vitalismo como una especie de actitud.
p a l a b r a s  C l a v e
Vitalismo, vitalismo sustantivo, vitalismo funcional, vitalismo actitudinal, Escuela 
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a b s t r a c t
I distinguish between ‘substantival’ and ‘functional’ forms of vitalism in 
the eighteenth century. Substantival vitalism presupposes the existence of 
a (substantive) vital force which either plays a causal role in the natural 
world as studied scientifically, or remains an immaterial, extra-causal 
entity. Functional vitalism tends to operate ‘post facto’, from the existence 
of living bodies to the search for explanatory models that will account 
for their uniquely ‘vital’ properties better than fully mechanistic models 
can. I discuss representative figures of the Montpellier school (Bordeu, 
Ménuret, Fouquet) as functional rather than substantival vitalists, and 
suggest an additional point regarding the reprisal of vitalism(s) in the 20th 
century, from Driesch to Canguilhem: that in addition to the substantival 
and functional varieties, we encounter a third species of vitalism, which 
I term ‘attitudinal’, as it argues for vitalism as a kind of attitude.
k e y W o r d s
Vitalism, substantival vitalism, functional vitalism, attitudinal vitalism, Montpel-
lier School, Driesch, Canguilhem.
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Vitalism has suffered from its nineteenth-century reinterpreta-
tions in terms of  ‘vital forces’ and ‘entelechies’, notably at the 
hands of  Hans Driesch (Driesch, 1914). It continues to be pre-
sented as a very extreme, almost mystical view in current biologi-
cal and philosophical discourse: in a recent review of  theoretical 
biology (Gilbert & Sarkar), we are told that “in vitalism, living 
matter is ontologically greater than the sum of  its parts because 
of  some life force (“entelechy”, “élan vital”, “vis essentialis”, etc.) 
which is added to or infused into the chemical parts”1. But when 
we consider the body of  writings produced by the ‘Montpellier 
vitalists’, that is, the physicians associated with the Faculty of  
Medicine at the University of  Montpellier in the second half  of  
the eighteenth century (the school considered in doctrinal terms 
was extended into the early nineteenth century by figures such 
as Jacques Lordat, but on increasingly dogmatic, non-clinical 
bases), we find no traces of  such metaphysically laden vital forces 
–or hardly any traces, for Paul-Joseph Barthez flirts with the idea 
in the first edition of  his Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme 
(1778; revised 1806) but gives up it subsequently2. Hence one can 
interpret this ‘Enlightenment’ form of  vitalism as functional rath-
er than substantive, as I have argued recently (Wolfe and Terada, 
2008; Wolfe, 2009c): it is more of  an attempt to ‘model’ or ‘de-
scribe’ organic life without reducing it to fully mechanical models 
or processes, than an overt metaphysics of  Life.
1 Gilbert & Sarkar, 2000, p. 1.
2 Barthez had initially asserted the existence of an independent vital force, but 
withdrew this and added a chapter to the second edition of his book entitled “Skepti-
cal considerations on the nature of the vital principle” (Barthez, 1858, III, p. 96 f.; all 
translations are mine unless otherwise indicated). He warned that one should follow 
an “invincible skepticism” (p. 32) or a “reasonable Pyrrhonism” (p. 274) when it 
comes to the vital principle. He only “personified” the vital principle, he explains, 
for ease of argument (p. 126). What does it mean to investigate the nature of life 
skeptically? Contrary to what one might expect, it does not mean to approach vital 
phenomena with a demystifying, deflationary attitude, but rather, that Barthez only 
wants to attribute properties to the vital principle “that result immediately from ex-
perience” (ibid.). 
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But perhaps we should not be too quick to dismiss the meta-
physical commitments of  vitalism and happily proclaim that it 
is a more ‘modern’, egalitarian vision of  embodiment free from 
some of  the aporias of  the ‘dialectic of  Enlightenment’ (as su-
ggested recently by Elizabeth Williams, or in a quite different 
way by Peter Hans Reill; see Williams, 2003; Reill, 2005). That is, 
maybe it is impossible to have a viable concept of  vitalism without 
also having some degree of  a metaphysical commitment towards 
either (a) the uniqueness of  living beings within the physical uni-
verse (this is the classic version, that of  Georg-Ernest Stahl and, 
differently, of  Driesch’s ‘neo-vitalism’) or (b) the idea that the act 
of  understanding what is unique about living beings requires a 
certain kind of  attitude (this is the modern version, articulated by 
Georges Canguilhem, who went so far as to proclaim himself  a 
vitalist, as I’ll discuss).
In this paper I want to return to the relation between the Mont-
pelliérain model of  vitalism and more metaphysically committed 
forms of  vitalism such as Stahl’s ‘animism’. I will suggest that 
the Newtonian-influenced, organizational, functional models of  
life developed by the Montpellier vitalists open onto an ‘attitu-
dinal’ vitalism which can survive the various counter-arguments 
mounted over the course of  the twentieth century, from the Vien-
na Circle onwards. But this attitudinal vitalism may still require 
(or ‘be’) a metaphysics.
substantival versus Functional vitalism
We are familiar with vitalism as a strong, ontologically laden 
commitment to the existence of  certain entities or ‘forces’, over 
and above the system of  causal relations studied and modeled 
by mechanical or mechanistic science, which itself  seeks to ex-
press these entities or the relations between them in mathemati-
cal terms. This is a common view of  the subject, whether it is 
presented in positive terms, as a kind of  commendable backlash 
against the de-humanizing, alienating trend inaugurated by the 
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Scientific Revolution, which seeks to ‘revitalize the world’ (and 
one can hear echoes here of  ‘reenchantment’3) or in negative 
terms, as a kind of  anti-scientific or ‘para-scientific’ trend which 
needs to be refuted (an example that comes to mind is Francis 
Crick’s rather confident pronouncement: “To those of  you who 
may be vitalists, I would make this prophecy: what everyone be-
lieved yesterday, and you believe today, only cranks will believe 
tomorrow”4). And there is plenty of  historical evidence that such 
a position existed.
But there is something wrong with this vision of  things; not 
because we can adduce one counter-example but because an en-
tire school does not fit the description: the so-called ‘Montpellier 
vitalists’, best known to eighteenth-century scholars because of  
their relation to Diderot (including his ‘postmodern’ usage of  
Bordeu as a fictional character in D’Alembert’s Dream5) and the 
Encyclopédie. And they are the ones for whom the term ‘vitalist’ 
was coined!
Who are they? Louis de Lacaze, Jean-Joseph Ménuret de 
Chambaud, Henri Fouquet, Théophile de Bordeu and perhaps 
most famously, Paul-Joseph Barthez. Barthez expresses a desire 
not to be equated with other vitalists: “I do not wish to be the 
Leader of  the Sect of  the Vitalists.”6 When Barthez speaks of  
this ‘sect’ he probably has in mind Charles-Louis Dumas, the au-
3 Cf. Elizabeth Williams’ comment that Montpellier vitalism “entailed conse-
quences markedly at odds with the universalizing discourse of Encyclopedist mate-
rialism, with its insistence on the uniformity of nature and the universality of physical 
laws” (2003, p. 177) –despite my appreciation of Williams’ work overall and our 
past and future shared projects, I disagree with this statement. Further work would 
have to confront this with Reill’s vision of a ‘vitalized’ Enlightenment in his (2005). 
The difference is that he thinks the Enlightenment has been misinterpreted precisely 
in this mechanistic fashion. If we think of figures such as La Mettrie, Buffon and 
Diderot it seems fair to say that the materialists did not have such strong beliefs in 
universal laws and most importantly, were ‘embodied’ theorists. I argue the case for 
La Mettrie in Wolfe (2009a) and for Diderot in Wolfe (2009b). 
4 Crick, 1966, p. 99.
5 Dieckmann, 1938; Kaitaro, 1997, ch. 3; Boury, 2003.
6 Barthez, 1806, p. 98, n. 18.
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thor of  a vitalist ‘synthesis’ published in 1800-1803 and, start-
ing in 1807, the Dean of  the ‘Ecole de Santé’ in Montpellier. As 
Elizabeth Williams has noted, “It was Dumas who, to further 
his ambitions and to defend Montpellier amid the institutional 
upheavals brought about by the Revolution, first began referring 
to ‘vitalism’, using this neologism to stress the unity and range of  
Montpellier teaching” (Williams, 2003, p. 276). 
The Montpellier medical faculty was one of  the oldest in Eu-
rope, possibly the oldest, only preceded by the ‘school’ at Saler-
no in the 11th and 12th centuries AD (the manuscripts of  which 
were kept from then until now at the monastery at nearby Monte 
Cassino), which was not however incorporated with license to 
train students. Documents of  incorporation and license to give 
diplomas date back to 1220-1240. It was also one of  the most 
institutionally flexible (especially in comparison to Paris) both 
with hiring and firing and with the sheer number of  professors of  
medicine there. 
Following the groundbreaking work of  Rey (1987, 2000), 
Duchesneau et al. (1997), and Williams (2003), who have done 
much to put it on the map, I have tried to argue that the Mont-
pellier vitalist school expresses a ‘structural-functional’ form of  
vitalism, with the celebrated image of  the bee-swarm (found in 
Maupertuis, Bordeu, Diderot and also Ménuret’s Encyclopédie ar-
ticle cited below) expressing the structural relation between one 
life and many lives (Wolfe & Terada, 2008). The bee-swarm is 
the single most famous image (and conceptual construct!) of  18th-
century vitalism. Here is Bordeu’s version: 
How to understand the action of  all the parts, their departments, and their 
periodic motions.
Might I make use of  a comparison which, however rough, may 
be useful?
I compare the living body, in order to properly assess the particu-
lar action of  each part, to a swarm of  bees which cluster together [se 
ramassent en pelotons], and hang from a tree like a bunch of  grapes; I 
find the image suggested by an ancient author, that one of  the lower 
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organs was an animal in animali7, to be quite helpful. Each part is, so 
to speak, not quite an animal, but a kind of  independent machine 
[machine à part] which contributes [concourt] in its way to the general 
life of  the body.
Hence, following the comparison to a bee swarm, it is a whole 
stuck to a tree branch, by means of  the action of  many bees which 
must act in concert to hold on; some others become attached to the 
initial ones, and so on; all concur [concourent] in forming a fairly solid 
body, yet each one has a particular action, apart from the others; if  
one of  them gives way or acts too vigorously, the entire mass will be 
disturbed: when they all conspire to stick close, to mutually embrace, 
in the order of  required proportions, they will comprise a whole 
which shall endure until they disturb one another.
The application is easy: the organs of  the body are connected to 
one another; they each have their district and their action; the rela-
tions between these actions, the resulting harmony, is what makes 
health. If  this harmony is disturbed, either because one part relaxes, 
or another wins out over that which is its usual antagonist, if  the ac-
tions are reversed, if  they no longer follow the natural order, these 
changes will constitute more or less severe illnesses8.
Similarly, in the Encyclopédie article “Observation”, Ménuret 
mentions the bee-swarm and Bordeu in order to emphasize that life 
in the body occurs, or is best described as, a “connection of  actions” 
(“liaison d’actions”):
One could, following these authors, compare man to a flock of  
cranes which fly together, in a particular order, without mutually 
assisting or depending on one another. The Physicians or Philoso-
phers who have studied and carefully observed man, have noticed 
this sympathy in all animal movements –this constant and necessary 
agreement in the interaction of  the various parts, however disparate 
or distant from one another; they have also noticed the disturbance 
of  the whole that results from the sensory disagreement of  a single 
part. A famous physician (M. de Bordeu) and an illustrious physicist 
(M. de Maupertuis) likewise compared man, from this luminous and 
7 This is apparently a very old euphemism for an organ that, as we might say, 
‘has a life of its own’…
8 Bordeu, 1751, § CXXV, in Bordeu, 1818, vol. 1, p. 187 (my translation).
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philosophical point of  view, to a swarm of  bees which strive together 
to hang to a tree branch. One can see them pressing and sustaining 
one another, forming a kind of  whole (une espèce de tout), in which 
each living part contributes in its way, by the correspondence and 
direction of  its movements, to sustain this kind of  life of  the whole 
body, if  we may refer in this way to a mere connection of  actions 
(liaison d’actions)9.
What the ‘vitalist’ Ménuret is doing here (and in a variety of  
other places including the important article on the pulse, “Pouls”) 
is actually setting forth a structural, relational, positional ap-
proach to what makes living bodies unique.
Not only is the form of  vitalism expressed in the above pas-
sages far removed from claims about mysterious vital forces; this 
structural-functional approach to life is also closer to material-
ism than is often said. Of  course this was not necessarily how it 
was seen: significant figures such as Bichat explicitly identified 
Barthez’s vital principle with Stahl’s anima and Van Helmont’s 
archaeus (Rey, 2000, p. 361); Broussais claimed that Barthez 
“founded medicine on his readings rather than observations”10. 
Bichat also says that the Montpellier physicians “considered 
scien ce philosophically; they would have made greater [scientific] 
progress if  they had known more anatomy”11. ‘Vitalism’ is a per-
petually reinvented polemical term, used so one thinker seeking 
to articulate a claim for the autonomy of  biological entities (like 
Bichat’s famous “la vie est l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent 
à la mort”) can accuse his predecessor of  having been the real 
vitalist.
9 Ménuret, s.v. “Observation,” Encyclopédie XI, pp. 318b-319a. (Further discus-
sion might focus on the variety of organismic metaphors in addition to this one, such 
as the polyp –more than a metaphor!).
10 Broussais, Examen des doctrines médicales (1821), quoted in Lavabre-Bertrand, 
1992, p. 89.
11 X. Bichat, Discours sur l’étude de la physiologie, included in Recherches physiolo-
giques sur la vie et sur la mort.
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If  the Montpellier vitalists were not ‘cranks’, who did believe 
the sort of  thing Crick makes fun of ? Georg-Ernest Stahl, a court 
physician to Duke Johann Ernst of  Saxon-Weimar and subse-
quently, as of  1694, a Professor of  Medicine at the University of  
Halle. 
stahl and driesch
Stahl bluntly stated a problem about Life in the early 1700s: in 
all these competing theories of  the human body, notably the very 
successful mechanistic theories, “Life was never mentioned nor 
defined, and I could find no logical definition provided”12. To fo-
llow Stahl’s suggestion, we could say that Life is either discussed 
but immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which 
subserve it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, 
animation are so co-extensive to the field of  investigation that 
Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. Stahl’s answer 
is a multi-tiered, extremely confusing system with metaphysical 
and physical levels, with specifically medical, biological, chemi-
cal and even physical levels; but he is, notoriously, an animist be-
cause he considers that the body and its organs are literally mere 
instruments of  the soul, a position sometimes revised so that “or-
gans are not, as the name might suggest, mere instruments”, but 
nevertheless, “it is the soul that makes the lungs breathe, the heart 
beat, the blood circulate, the stomach digest, the liver secrete”13.
Despite their criticism of  mechanistic models for Life –for 
their inertness, for their inapplicability to living beings, and so 
forth– the Montpellier vitalists are quite dismissive of  this intru-
sion of  a non-medical entity (the soul) into medical explanations. 
(The missing figure in this story is Haller and what Duchesneau 
calls his ’special mechanist hypothesis’.) Here is Ménuret: 
12 Stahl, 1706a, in Stahl, 1859, p. 224.
13 Stahl, 1706b, § xcviii, in Stahl 1859, p. 347.
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Who wouldn’t laugh at an animist or Stahlian who would argue 
that this illness is a gift of  Nature or the soul, a kind and farsighted 
mother who directs all efforts to heal the illness, and even exacer-
bates them on the pretext of  necessity, hoping for benefits that one 
hopelessly expects from elsewhere? (“Ténesme,” Enc. XVI, p. 137a).
In a very different way, Bordeu, in his masterpiece the Recher-
ches anatomiques sur la position et la function des glandes (1751), when 
discussing the (very philosophical) problem of  whether the secre-
tory process of  the glands can be reduced to a type of  sensation or 
not, makes a gentler, but equally distancing comment on Stahl’s 
notion of  anima. Bordeu answers his question in the affirmative: 
each gland, each orifice will possess its own unique “taste” so to 
speak which will enable it to accept or reject various substances. 
And when he calls it a type of  sensation he adds a footnote to the 
word ‘sensation’, and emphasizes that both this idea of  sensation 
and Stahl’s anima are metaphors:
(*) This is again one of  these metaphors which must be allowed us ; 
those who consider these questions closely know just how difficult it 
is to explain oneself, when it comes to speaking of  the force which so 
carefully directs a thousand singular motions in the human body and 
its parts; what terms should we use to describe them? For instance, 
certain movements in plants and even certain properties of  miner-
als; some ‘physicists’ [physiciens], struck by these movements, have 
had recourse to particular causes. We will discuss Stahl’s hypothesis 
elsewhere: he claimed that the soul directed everything in the animal 
body. Whatever the case may be, we can state that all living parts 
are directed by a preserving or conservative force [force conservatrice] 
which is ever-vigilant; does this force belong, in certain respects, to 
the essence of  a portion of  matter, or is it a necessary attribute of  its 
combinations? Once again, here we can only suggest a way of  con-
ceiving things, metaphorical expressions, comparisons [...]14.
14 Bordeu, 1751, § 108, p. 163.
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To say that the Stahlian concept of  soul is a metaphor (which 
Stahl does not say!) is essentially to say that the concept has func-
tional value (or not) depending on how well it models phenomena 
–rather than making a claim about what sorts of  things exist. If  
Bordeu were writing sometime after the 1970s he would quite 
likely have spoken of  such images as ‘heuristics’. 
Stahlian animism versus vitalism as articulated in the Mont-
pellier school are thus two distinct models of  ‘life’, of  organism, of  
the approach required to understand living beings15. Of  course 
within the Montpellier school there is a spectrum of  views, from 
Sauvages’ more Stahlian, animism-friendly to Fouquet or Mé-
nuret’s materialistic and in fact mechanism-friendly views. Ménu-
ret after all goes as far as presenting the human body as a struc-
tural ensemble of  “springs,” which taken as a whole “all pursue 
an overall motion”; a kind of  “irritability or sensitivity spreads 
throughout, animates the springs, excites their motions,”16 etc.: 
good mechanistic language! But the point is that we have a sub-
stantival form of  vitalism (also ‘ontological’) and a functional form.
The Stahlian belief  in ‘anima’ is quite similar qua form of  vi-
talism, to the position of  the embryologist Hans Driesch in the 
late nineteenth century. Driesch comes out of  the school of  Wil-
helm Roux’s Entwicklungsmechanik or study of  the mechanisms 
of  the developmental process, and (in)famously moved from ex-
perimentation with sea urchin eggs, discovering feature of  “to-
tipotency,” to the metaphysical theory of  entelechies existing in 
all living organisms. Faced with the evidence that there was no 
physical structure we can find in the sea urchin embryo which is 
responsible for the “regulative” or “equipotential” force, he felt 
obliged to posit a non-spatial vital force, the entelechy. An en-
15 Neither of these directly flow into the constitution of ‘biology’ as a science, in 
the first years of the nineteenth century (Wolfe forthcoming 2011b); Stahl is much 
more concerned with chemistry, even if it is in part what we would call organic 
chemistry, and the montpelliérains are, tautologically, much more concerned with 
medicine.
16 Ménuret de Chambaud, art. “Spasme,” Enc. XV, 435b.
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telechy uses the physicochemical forces of  the organism, but is 
not ‘of ’ them. The classic refutation of  Drieschian vitalism came 
with the Vienna Circle (especially Moritz Schlick). The argument 
relies on the causal closure of  the physical (space-time) world, to 
point out contra Driesch that there cannot be nonspatial causes 
of  organic processes which are themselves necessarily spatial: 
“if  the causes are fully contained in the initial conditions, then 
there is no reason whatsoever for the assumption of  a non-spatial 
intermediary”17. What we will see with Canguilhem (via Claude 
Bernard, who himself  was interested by Diderot’s late writings 
on physiology18) is that one can share the rejection of  mysterious 
vital forces without necessarily adopting such a reductionist ap-
proach to the biological.
vitalism as an attitude: canguilhem
There is doubtless no need to introduce the philosopher and his-
torian of  the life sciences Georges Canguilhem here. But he is 
more famous for his work on the normal and the pathological, 
and his relation to Foucault, than as a theorist or practitioner of  
vitalism. Canguilhem often refers to vitalism in his work, going 
as far as describing himself  as one in the Foreword to 1955 book 
on the development of  the notion of  reflex action: “Il nous im-
porte peu d’être ou tenu pour vitaliste…” and presenting the book 
itself  as a “defense of  vitalist biology”19. Even if  he is wearing 
the hat of  the historian of  medicine, looking at the construction 
of  a concept (say, the cell theory), Canguilhem the philosopher 
asks highly ‘motivated’ questions of  science, in a manner which 
undoubtedly owes a great deal to Bachelard’s historical episte-
mology. The history of  science has to study possible conceptual 
developments rather than just invalidate the past (the error of  
17 Schlick, 1953, p. 536.
18 Barral, 1900.
19 Canguilhem, 1955, Avant-Propos, p. 1.
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‘presentism’). What this entails for vitalism is that it has a specifi-
cally philosophical place, whether it is scientifically ‘validated’ or 
‘refuted’, and apart from its status as a scientific ‘construction’.
In this sense, Canguilhem suggests, vitalism is not like geocen-
trism or phlogiston (to pick two classic cases of  scientific ‘errors’): it 
is not refutable in quite the same way20. Vitalism is generally consid-
ered to have been ‘refuted’ twice. First, according to a celebrated 
scientific tale, with Wöhler’s synthesis of  urea in 1828, which 
showed that organic substances can be produced out of  inorganic 
compounds, thus invalidating the claim that the chemistry of  the 
living body is categorically distinct from that of  inanimate bo-
dies. Second, a century later, this time because of  physics, in early 
twentieth-century Vienna Circle arguments against Hans Driesch 
and Bergson, in the name of  the causal closure of  the space-time 
world21. The undead character of  vitalism shows up in the first 
case, with Wöhler’s synthesis of  urea, when people start to de-
scribe the purported refutation as a “chemical legend” (including 
because the synthesis was actually only performed by Berthelot 
later on), and when chemists like Berzelius continue to speak of  
vital forces afterwards22; in the second case, substantival vitalism 
is refuted, not what we might call explanatory or heuristic vitalism 
–which are derivative forms of  what I’ve earlier called functional 
vitalism.
So not only is vitalism a unique kind of  historical object; 
much more metaphysically, Canguilhem suggests that it is Life 
20 Canguilhem, 1965, p. 84.
21 See Frank, 1998 [1932], especially chapter 4; Wolsky & Wolsky, 1992.
22 McKie, 1954. See also Schiller, 1967 (on Berzelius and von Liebig); Ramberg, 
2000. For the classic, ‘heroic’ view of Wöhler see Jacques (1950). Raymond Ruyer 
conversely asserts the link between chemistry and vitalism, declaring that it was “lack 
of chemical knowledge” that made seventeenth-century Cartesian biologists be me-
chanists (Ruyer, 1958, p. 51). If we look back at Stahl, he insists on the importance 
of chemistry for conceptualizing what is unique in organic beings (their characteristic 
mixtio rather than mere aggregates) but, somewhat dialectically, he adds that once 
that reaches the level of a theoria medica vera , then one can dispense with the chemical 
analysis of bodies, like the ladder we leave behind after having climbed up it (not his 
image!). Stahl, 1706a in Stahl, 1859, vol. 2, p. 224.
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itself which dictates a certain kind of  attitude on the part of  the 
inquirer. There is something about Life that places the knower in 
a special relation to it. Indeed Canguilhem frequently makes an 
overtly metaphysical, ahistorical claim that the living animal is 
necessarily a knower, so that conversely, the nature of  Life itself  
forces the knower to approach it in a certain way.
The idea is that vitalism is a fundamental existential attitude 
–not just one historical episode amongst others:
Vitalism expresses a permanent requirement or demand [exigence] of  
life in living beings, the self-identity of  life which is immanent in 
living beings. This explains why mechanistic biologists and rational-
ist philosophers criticize vitalism for being nebulous and vague. It 
is normal, if  vitalism is primarily a ‘demand’, that it is difficult to 
formulate it in a series of  determinations23.
Vitalism expresses a permanent “requirement” or “demand” 
of  life as present in living beings; the self-identity of  Life imma-
nent within living beings. What exactly is this “requirement”? 
Something teleological? Purposive? Vitalism in Canguilhem’s 
thought may be a heuristic concept: cf  word exigence (he uses it 
a lot): vitalism is “more a requirement than a method, an ethics 
rather than a theory”24. Now, it may be a requirement rather than 
a theory, but it is, I suggest, a big requirement: that Life itself, 
symmetrically to the inquirer’s attitude, is understood as self-posi-
ting, spontaneous activity:
It is certain that the vitalists view generation as the basic biological 
phenomenon, for the images it generates and the problems it raises 
impact all other biological phenomena. A vitalist, I would suggest, 
is someone who is led to reflect on the nature of  life more because 
23 Canguilhem, “Aspects du vitalisme”, in Canguilhem, 1965, p. 86.
24 Ibid., p. 88. Although the image of the egg sounds more like Driesch (except it’s 
also in Harvey and the Oxford physiologists) than like Bordeu or Ménuret.
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of  the contemplation of  an egg than because of  s/he has handled a 
hoist or a bellows25. 
Notice how the above passage moves imperceptibly from the 
historical (a description of  “the vitalists”) to the assertive (“a vi-
talist is…”), and even to the prescriptive (in his best-known writ-
ings on the ‘normal and the pathological’).
Vitalism then has two dimensions in Canguilhem’s thought: 
on the one hand it is heuristic, a claim that living phenomena need 
to be approached in a certain way in order to be understood; on 
the other hand, it also possesses a more ontological dimension. 
Consider his example: vitalism is not like (the theory of) phlogis-
ton or geocentrism. Faced with this ‘fact’ that vitalism is not like 
phlogiston, there are two possible responses:
it’s not like phlogiston because it’s true and thus one’s ontology needs 
to include it (like Driesch’s entelechies);
it’s not like phlogiston because it has this heuristic value, or ex-
planatory power.
In fact, it’s not entirely clear where Canguilhem falls in this 
divide. However, his comments on vitalism as an “orientation” 
(what I have called an attitude) tend towards the latter interpreta-
tion. Indeed, it is clear that both philosophically and as a historian 
of  science (to reintroduce this naïve distinction) he is careful to 
distinguish his claims from the more inflated ones of  substantival 
vitalism. (I return to the question of  whether vitalism is or is not 
like phlogiston or geocentrism in closing, ‘bad science’.)
Canguilhem is careful to distinguish strong metaphysical vital-
ism à la Driesch from the views (and practices) of  the eighteenth-
century vitalists. This is the theme of  ‘biological Newtonianism’ 
(referring to the popularity of  Newtonian analogies amongst the 
vitalists in the eighteenth century, among others):
25 Ibid.
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Eighteenth-century vitalists are […] not impenitent metaphysicians 
but rather prudent positivists, which is to say, in that period, New-
tonians. Vitalism is first of  all the rejection of  all metaphysical theo-
ries of  the essence of  life. This why most of  the vitalists referred to 
Newton as the model of  a scientist concerned with observation and 
experiment. […] Vitalism ultimately means the recognition of  life as 
an original set or realm [ordre] of  phenomena, and thus the recogni-
tion of  the specificity of  biological knowledge26.
A medical vitalist in the eighteenth century is not a substan-
tival, metaphysical vitalist of  the late nineteenth or early twen-
tieth century. The importance of  the Newtonian motif  is that, 
by means of  an analogy with Newton’s method in positing an 
unknown entity (such as gravity) from which he can then derive 
a series of  mathematical equations with real tangible value, the 
vitalists can say: let me posit this unknown called ‘life’ and derive 
from it various other phenomena, from digestion to sensation, 
to the functioning of  the glands: these suddenly appear as inter-
connected, goal-oriented processes which do not exist either in 
an inanimate mechanism –or a corpse. But significantly the vita-
list will make no ontological claims about the nature of  this vital 
principle, or even attempt to make causal connections between 
such a principle and observable phenomena; Barthez: “I am as 
indifferent as could be regarding Ontology considered as the scien-
ce of  entities”27.
What’s tricky about Canguilhem is that he both rejects meta-
physical, substantival vitalism (he uses Spinozist language to deny 
that in reality there can be a ‘kingdom within a kingdom’), and 
asserts the “originality of  biological phenomena,” we might say 
their autonomy, as a “over the totality of  experience.” What looks 
at first glance like metaphysical holism might instead be an ‘atti-
tudinal’ conception, that is, a point of  view on experience. Indeed, 
26 Canguilhem, 1955, p. 113.
27 Barthez, 1806), p. 96, note 17.
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even when Canguilhem discusses the uniqueness of  organisms 
he never denies that their ‘holistic’ quality is enabled by various 
regulatory processes or mechanisms that subserve the whole and 
preserve its integrity (much like Cannon’s notion of  homeostasis, 
itself  explicitly indebted at least theoretically to Bernard’s notion 
of  milieu intérieur).
In a very real sense one cannot distinguish between a histori-
cal claim and a philosophical claim in Canguilhem’s ‘history of  
vitalism’ or ‘vitalism’. They cohere around the claim that vitalism 
is an “attitude” (“une orientation de la pensée biologique”) rather 
than strictly an episode (“une étape de sa démarche”)28.
Nevertheless, even if  we can agree that vitalism is unlike geo-
centrism or phlogiston in the way Canguilhem suggested, and we 
can see the possible interest in discussing vitalism as an ‘attitude’, 
we should also recognize that Canguilhem’s revisionist project 
to put the life sciences at center stage in the history of  science 
ove rall (which had traditionally been dominated by the hard sci-
ences) is bound up with strong ontological commitments, and a 
certain conceptual vagueness to boot. Namely, his project must 
amount to a claim regarding the specificity of  its object, but it is 
not easy to make out exactly which claim he wants to make:
Life itself  as an object is ontologically unique, including in its anom-
alousness; living entities are meaningful and meaning-producing en-
tities and thus have to be understood as such (this covers both the 
existential and the Goldsteinian aspects of  his claim).
Canguilhem’s vagueness appears, e.g., when he denies that 
vitalism is a metaphysics, and then adds immediately afterwards 
that it is “the recognition of  the originality of  the fact of  life [le 
fait vital]”29. 
28 “Aspects du vitalisme,” in Canguilhem, 1965, p. 84.
29 Canguilhem, “Le normal et le pathologique,” in Canguilhem, 1965, p. 156.
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conclusion
I have tried to illustrate the existence of  three forms of  vitalism: 
substantival, functional and attitudinal. It is typically the first 
form which is targeted in critiques of  vitalism (such as that dat-
ing back to the Vienna Circle); it is represented here by Stahl and 
Driesch. The second form matches up fairly well with what phi-
losophers of  science in contemporary times would call ‘heuristic’ 
concepts of  mechanism or organism, as explanatory structures 
or models. Historically, this ‘functional’ kind of  vitalism is as-
sociated with the Montpellier school and with the attempt to ar-
ticulate a relation between parts and whole in which the parts are 
construed as little lives (recall the image of  the bee-swarm, a Life 
composed of  many little lives). The third, attitudinal (projectivist) 
form is chiefly articulated by Georges Canguilhem (influenced by 
Kurt Goldstein).
A few questions then arise: 
•	 What is the posterity of  this ‘Montpellier form’ of  vitalism? 
Here we face an immediate difficulty inherent in tying En-
lightenment natural philosophy or medicine to developments 
beginning in the nineteenth century (which the history of  
medicine and related disciplines could view as ‘positive sci-
ence’, as in the work of  Claude Bernard). Yet in a different 
sense closer to intellectual history, it is worth emphasizing 
that the words ‘vitalism’ and ‘biology’ are coined at about the 
same time, and in that sense an investigation of  the model 
or concept of  organic life (organism, animal economy, and 
so on) characteristic of  Montpellier vitalism could shed some 
light on the series of  conceptual shifts that take place in the 
generation before the emergence of  ‘biology’ as a science – not 
least since several of  its founders, such as Lamarck and Tre-
viranus, explicitly state they are responding to the need for a 
science specific to the conditions of  Life. Just because an epi-
sode such as Montpellier vitalism does not get to be part of  the 
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history of  medicine the way John Snow’s discovery of  cholera 
does, does not mean we have to go along with Francis Crick’s 
pronouncement quoted above, or with similar scientific views 
that vitalism is a kind of  verbiage quickly dispelled by mo-
lecularized life science. It is sometimes suggested that vitalism 
is primarily a vision developed by physicians, not biologists, 
which is why it is not so surprising that it has vanished from 
the philosophy of  biology. This specifically medical dimen-
sion can be conveyed in the basic claim that all living beings 
die and get sick – hence there is a necessary axiological ele-
ment (that is, an element of  values or norms). 
•	 There is also the related issue of  how closely we can link, or 
correlate, ‘ontological shifts’ with the emergence of  a science. 
In this particular case, there is the very broad question ‘does 
vitalism impact the history of  science’ and the slightly more 
specific one ‘does vitalism lead to a science such as biology?’ 
One version of  this is to emphasize how, faced with mecha-
nism and animism at opposite extremes, vitalism avoided “the 
worst of  both systems” and developed the best parts, notably 
their explanatory richness and a kind of  synthetic experimen-
tal protocol. Roger French suggests that out of  this “What 
emerged was the idea of  biological properties, that is, qualities 
(principally of  sensation and motion) that were unique to liv-
ing systems and not to be derived from a mechanical model.” 
I am not sure this actually happened in the way he presents 
it. For one thing, the figure who much more closely matches 
this story is Albrecht von Haller, whose relation to vitalism is 
complicated to say the least (also for reasons like the rivalry 
between him and Bordeu). Haller famously combines a rigor-
ous micro-mechanistic vision of  the phenomena of  life with a 
careful set of  arguments for the uniqueness of  features such as 
irritability and sensibility which are specific to living, organic 
beings. The most negative answer to the question ‘does vital-
ism impact the science of  life (or even lead to a science such as 
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biology)?’ would be, like Crick’s attitude, the idea that vitalism 
is a paradigm case of  ‘bad science’ to be ontologically elimi-
nated. Rather than trying to decide this outright, I suggest that 
we can reconceptualize the issue charitably by viewing it as an 
alternative between vitalism as a permanent impulse for life 
science; or as a permanent folk belief  (‘folk biology’); neither 
of  which are ontologically eliminable.
 In none of  the cases we have seen (Stahl, the Montpellier vital-
ists, Canguilhem, etc.) does it appear to me to be straightfor-
wardly the case that a vitalist ‘theory’ or ‘claim’ or ‘metaphor’ 
gets naturalized or formalized or quantified and turned into 
mainstream science – with the exceptions of  Blumenbach et 
al. (which have no medical connection). However, there is a 
distinctive ‘form of  life’ that emerges in the reflections of  the 
Montpellier School and the various related projects, whether 
antecedent (Glisson, Willis, Stahl), contemporary and con-
genial (Diderot), contemporary and competitive (Haller), or 
posterior (Cabanis, Bichat, Bernard). In that sense I hope to 
have called attention to a different ‘face’ of  vitalism than the 
one usually seen. 
Versions of  this paper have been presented at AAHPSSS 
2010, University of  Sydney and HSS 2010, Montréal. 
Thanks to Paul Griffiths for helpful comments, and to 
Phillip Sloan for his invitation. This is part of  a book 
project on the history of  modern vitalism.
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